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INTRODUCTION 
The trial court did not come close to abusing its discretion by allowing 
Sean Lewis to testify. His anticipated testimony was adequately disclosed and 
~ timely supplemented. And even if the supplement was untimely, RJW was not 
prejudiced. Heath's supplemental disclosure explained that Lewis would testify 
that "a dwelling requires cooking facilities and more particularly, the structure 
needs to be plumbed with a 220V outlet for a stove." (R.2612.) Heath had staked 
out this exact position six months earlier in the report of his retained expert, Eric 
Hoff. (R.2580-84.) And Heath's architect was deposed and testified that the 
"county defines accessory dwelling units" to require "a range that would require 
a 220 outlet or a gas line." (R.1808.) Thus, RJW cannot plausibly claim that it 
was surprised by anything Lewis testified about. Indeed, this is precisely why 
RJW objected that Lewis's testimony was "cumulative and duplicative." (R.2562.) 
But even if RJW could prove that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing Lewis to testify, RJW cannot meet its additional burden: proving that 
the error was harmful, i.e., that it changed the outcome. RJW ignores the fact that 
it had the ultimate burden of proving that Heath breached the CC&Rs. As a 
result, RJW' s brief inadvertently demonstrates that the alleged error was 
harmless. RJW accepts the trial court's conclusion that the "practice and policy" 
of Summit County was applicable to this question. (Aplt. Br. at 44.) And RJW 
argues that Lewis was the only witness to testify "regarding Summit County's 
practice and procedure for determining whether a structure was residential." 
(Aplt. Br. at 43, 45.) RJW then concludes: "Without Lewis's testimony, the district 
court lacked evidence to determine ·whether the carriage house was a residence." (Aplt. 
Br. at 44 (emphasis added).) 
That gets it backwards. To RJW, this means the allegedly erroneous 
admission of Lewis's testimony was ultimately prejudicial; but in fact it shows 
just the opposite. Because RJW had the burden of proving that the carriage 
house was a residence, RJW' s assertion that, absent Lewis's testimony, "the 
district court lacked evidence to determine whether the carriage house was a 
residence" is fatal to RJW' s second-residence claim. Nowhere in its brief does 
RJW even argue that, absent Lewis's testimony, RJW affirmatively proved its 
case. And for good reason: Lewis's testimony did not change the outcome. 
Besides that, RJW's assertion that Lewis was the only witness to testify 
about the "residence" issue is incorrect. As noted, RJW moved to exclude 
Lewis's testimony because it was "cumulative and duplicative." (R.2562.) And 
indeed it was. Two architects- Hoff and Michael Upwall- also testified that, in 
their experience with the policy and practice of Summit County, Heath's carriage 
house did not qualify as a residence. (R.2809:53; 2810:39-40.) That conclusion 
fully comports with the ordinary meaning of "residence" and "single family 
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dwelling," which ultimately governs the interpretation of the CC&Rs. Thus, 
RJW is correct that the trial court lacked evidence that the carriage house was a 
residence; but there was ample evidence, even absent Lewis's testimony, that the 
carriage house was not a residence. For this reason also, any error in admitting 
Lewis's testimony was harmless. 
Likewise, at trial RJW had the burden of proving that under the CC&Rs 
Heath did not get proper approval for his project. On appeal, RJW has the 
additional burden of proving that the trial court's decision on this issue was 
clearly erroneous. But instead of showing clear error, RJW asserts that the 
"record evidences exh·eme confusion regarding the plans at issue in this case and 
when and to whom various sets of plans were submitted." (Aplt. Br. at 47.) 
Alleged evidentiary "confusion" does not equal clear error, much less prove a 
party's affirmative case. And contrary to RJW's arguments, the record is, in fact, 
quite clear that Heath submitted "complete plans" that were approved by the 
HOA. Three witnesses, Heath, Upwall, and Michael Stoker, all testified that 
complete plans were submitted and approved. 
RJW' s effort to undermine this testimony only undermines its own case. 
RJW argues that the approved plans were not complete plans because there is 
some suggestion in the record that the plans changed after Heath received 
approval. RJW argues that the "record is thin as to what took place following the 
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[approval]." (Aplt. Br. at 18.) But that doesn't support its appeal because RJW 
can't actually prove that the plans changed-the record is too "thin." 
RJW also acknowledges that "there is no evidence in the record that the 
plans approved by Stoker and the AC [i.e.; the HOA's Architectural Committee] 
are the plans that Heath ultimately had submitted to the county and for which 
Heath received a building permit." (Aplt. Br. at 48.) This might be persuasive if 
Heath had the burden of proving that the plans were the same. But again, 
because R]W bears the burden, the lack of evidence of any difference between the 
plans approved by the AC and the plans approved by the county defeats its case. 
Tellingly, RJW offered no evidence that the residence Heath actually built differs 
in any material way from what the AC approved. RJW's speculation about the 
possibility that the plans changed is not a basis for reversal. 
Heath asks this Court to affirm the trial court on both issues raised on ~ 
appeal. On the first issue, allowing Lewis to testify was well within the trial 
court's discretion and, by RJW' s own admission, any error was harmless. On the 
second issue, the decision of the trial court, as the factfinder, is not against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(i). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Sean Lewis was one of three credible witnesses to testify about the 
policy and practice of Summit County in determining whether a structure is a 
~ residence. As RJW noted, Lewis's testimony was "cumulative and duplicative." 
And RJW offered no contrary evidence. Assuming arguendo that the trial court 
erred in allowing Lewis to testify, the first issue is whether that error was 
harmless.1 
Standard of Review: An error is harmless "if, upon a review of the record, 
there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." LePet, 
Inc. v. Mower, 872 P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation marks omitted). 
2. Heath disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert six months before 
trial and gave a brief description of his anticipated testimony. Heath 
supplemented that disclosure after interviewing Lewis. Lewis's testimony did 
not introduce any new issues. And RJW did not move to strike Lewis's 
testimony until four days before trial. The second issue is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by allowing Lewis to testify. 
Standard of Review: "The trial court is afforded broad discretion to admit 
or exclude evidence, and we will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." 
Lawrence v. Mountainstar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40, ir 16. In reviewing for 
1 If the answer is yes, then the Court need not address the second issue. 
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abuse of discretion, the court "will not reverse a trial court's ruling on evidence 
unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Id. 
3. Three witnesses testified that "complete plans" were submitted to 
-:=1p1•wnuari hu f-ha J-T() A 
U 1-"J.VY'-'"'"4. VJ t..&.&.'-,., .A.&."'---',1..a... RJ\J\l submitted no evidence that what Heath 
actually built differs in any way from the plans that were approved. The third 
issue is whether the trial court's finding that plans were appropriately submitted 
and approved was against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 
UT App 61, ,I 5 (quotation marks omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. RJW Media, Inc. contends that the carriage house 
Chuck Heath constructed violated the CC&Rs. RJW sued Heath for breach of 
contract and nuisance, and sought declaratory judgment and an injunction. (R.1-
13.) 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. RJW' s complaint alleged 
sixteen violations of the CC&Rs. The trial court granted summary judgment on 
13 of the 16 claims. (R.2727-45.) RJW has not appealed that ruling. 
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A bench trial was held on the three remaining claims: (1) whether the 
HOA approved the carriage house as required by Article II, Section 2 of the 
CC&Rs; (2) whether the carriage house exceeded the height limitations in Article 
~ IV, Section 5 of the CC&Rs; and (3) whether the carriage house violated the one-
residence limitation in Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs. (R.3018-20.) Over 
RJW' s objection, Sean Lewis, the Summit County planner, was allowed to testify 
as a nonretained expert on the third issue. (R.2808:15-17.) 
The court ruled in Heath's favor on all three issues, finding that RJW had 
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Heath breached the CC&Rs. 
(R.3017-35.) RJW appeals two of the three issues: (1) whether the carriage house 
was a second residence, and (2) whether Heath received the required approval 
from the HOA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts Related to the Disclosure of Sean Lewis. Heath disclosed Lewis as 
a non-retained expert on September 27, 2013- almost six months before trial. 
(Aplt. Br. Add. B.) Lewis was listed along with several others with the following 
description of their anticipated testimony: 
Defendants/Counterclaimants identify the following "non-retained" 
experts as they provided architectural, planning, construction, and 
or design services for the Heath project. Additionally, these 
witnesses may be asked to provide specific architectural design, 
7 
construction, or general building opinions regarding the Heath 
carriage house .... 
(Aplt. Br. Add. B.) RJW did not object or ask for additional information. 
Lewis was known to the parties because he was involved in the approval 
process for the construction on Heath's lot. (R.190.) In fact, on October 25, 2013, 
R]W disclosed Lewis as a possible fact witness. (R.806-08.) 
After an amended scheduling order, on December 20, 2013, Heath again 
disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert, with the same description that was 
previously given. (R.955-65.) RJW again did not object or ask for additional Cii.. 
information. 
On March 3, 2014, after "several failed attempts," Heath's counsel was able 
to interview Lewis. (R.2666.) Heath supplemented his disclosures the next day 
by explaining more specifically that Lewis would testify about what a dwelling or 
accesson; dwelling is under the Snyderville Basin Development Code ("SBDC"): 
Sean [Lewis] was already included on our wih1ess list and is 
expected to testify that a dwelling or accessory dwelling, under the 
[SBDC] and the County's interpretation thereof, the carriage 
house/ garage is not a dwelling/ accessory dwelling/ residential unit. 
Mr. Lewis is expected to testify that a dwelling requires cooking 
facilities and more particularly, the structure needs to be plumbed 
with a 220V outlet for a stove. 
(R.2612.) 
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Three days later, just four days before trial, RJW filed a motion to exclude 
Lewis. (R.2556-2618.) RJW argued that the initial description of Lewis's 
anticipated testimony was inadequate and the supplemental disclosure was 
(.;0) untimely. (R.2561.) RJW said it would be "severely prejudiced" if Lewis was 
allowed to testify, but that Heath would not be prejudiced "because he has 
already designated Eric Hoff to testify about these very same matters" so that 
"the expected testimony of ... Mr. Lewis is cumulative and duplicative of 
testimony that is already expected to be introduced at trial." (R.2562.) 
Indeed, Lewis's proposed testimony was nothing new. On September 27, 
2013, the same day Lewis was initially disclosed as a nonretained expert, Heath 
designated Eric Hoff as an expert. (R.2558, 2580-84.) Hoff's report explained that 
the carriage house was not a Dwelling Unit or Dwelling Unit Accessory under the 
I.@ SBDC-the exact issue Lewis would testify about. Hoff's report explained: 
[Section] 10-11-1.103 of the [SBDC] defines Dwelling Unit as: 
"A building or portion thereof containing living facilities, including 
provision for sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation, and is 
intended for occupancy by a family and its guests, independent of 
other families; may also be referred to as a dwelling." 
The Heath Carriage House does not contain provisions for cooking, 
specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking range, and therefore 
cannot be considered a Dwelling Unit. ... 
[Section] 10-11-1.104 of the [SBDC] defines Dwelling Unit, Accessory 
as: 
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"A structure or a portion of a structure which is used by the owner 
of the primary residency or primary tenant as a dwelling for the 
private use of the property owner's relatives, domestic help, 
caretakers, nursing staff, house guests, or similar users. An 
accessory dwelling unit shall contain cooking, sanitation, and 
sleeping facilities." 
Once again, the Heath Carriage House does not contain provisions 
for cooking, specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking range, 
and therefore cannot be considered an Accessory Dwelling Unit. 
(R.2584.) 
On November 11, 2013, RJW served the rebuttal report of its expert, Rick 
Brighton. (R.2586-94.) Brighton offered his contrary opinion that the carriage 
house was a dwelling under the SBDC: 
The carriage house/ garage contains habitable living space on 
its second level. Specifically, the second story includes electrical, 
mechanical and plumbing sufficient for sleeping, eating, cooking 
and sanitation. As such, under the [SBDC], it constitutes a dwelling 
or habitable living space. See Code§§ 10-11-1.103 and 10-11-1.104. 
In fact, the second level includes a wet bar and kitchen. For these 
reasons, the second story violates the CCRs because it is a second 
residential sh·ucture on one lot. 
(R.2588.) 
Heath filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2014 that raised 
this issue. (R.972, 997.) In support, Heath cited the deposition testimony of his 
architect, Michael Upwall. Upwall testified that the carriage house was not a 
residence because it did not have a stove: 
10 
You would not be able to install a- I believe the way the 
county defines accessory dwelling units is number of cooking- so if 
you did a range that would require a 220 outlet or a gas line, you 
cannot have that. Could you put a microwave in there and pop 
popcorn? Yes. . . . But ... there is no range, which would imply 
cooking. 
(R.1808.) 
And in a declaration supporting his motion, Heath testified that the 
carriage house was not a residence because it "does not provide for sleeping," 
there is "no bed," it "does not contain a stove, nor does it have a gas line or 220 
volt outlet for a stove," and Heath had "no intent to use [it] for residential 
purposes, or as habitable living space, or as a dwelling." 2 (R.1825.) 
Thus, when Heath supplemented his description of Lewis's anticipated 
testimony to explain that he would testify "that a dwelling requires cooking 
facilities and 1nore particularly, the structure needs to be plumbed with a 220V 
outlet for a stove" (R.2612), RJW's objection that this proposed testimony was 
"cumulative and duplicative" was not off base.3 
2 The trial court denied Heath's motion for summary judgment on this issue 
because of "conflicting evidence concerning the features of the second level of 
the carriage house/ garage, such as whether there is a kitchen or a bathroom." 
(R.2739.) 
3 There is, of course, nothing wrong with cumulative or duplicative testimony. 
Having four architects support your position is better than having three. 
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District Court Rules That Lewis Can Testify. The trial court heard RJW' s 
motion to exclude Lewis on the first day of trial. RJW' s counsel argued that 
Lewis was "going to be testifying about something that has never been on the 
horizon with respect to how the building code is interpreted." 
court ruled: 
With regard to Mr. Lewis ... that is a close call in this case. 
He was disclosed. The disclosure, probably, is a little too generic, 
but what's supposed to happen, at that point, I think, is we have a 
disclosure. We have these, sort of, generic disclosures that you've 
made as a matter of practice. 
[RJW' s counsel] got to decide, based on that, whether he's 
going to depose these guys or not and it seems, to me, that there, 
probably, is some obligation on the part of [RJW], at that point, to 
say, hey, I don't have enough information. Please give me more 
information. Your disclosure is, in my view, insufficient and, if no 
response is forthcoming, I think at that point [RJW] would be well-
positioned to say, hey, these folks shouldn't be allowed to testify. 
On the other hand, I'm not sure it's fair to take a disclosure 
that is, sort of, borderline and not raise any objections to it until the 
eve of h·ial. 
So I'm going to allow Mr. Lewis to go ahead and testify. He 
was disclosed. Even though the disclosure was borderline, I'm 
going to allow the testimony to come in. 
(R.2808:15-17.) The court also expressly ruled that Heath's September and ~ 
December 2013 disclosures satisfied the requirements of Rule 26(a)(4)(E). 
(R.2808:17.) 
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Evidence at Trial Regarding the Carriage House. The one-residence rule 
~ of Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs governs the dispute over the carriage 
house: 
Nurnbcr _and_ Location of Buildings. No buildings or structures shall be 
placed, erected, altered, or permitted to remain on any Lot other than one 
single family dwelling- together with related nonresidential structures 
and improvements. 
VP (R.105.) The parties agree this provision limits construction to a single 
"residence," but disagree on whether the carriage house constitutes a second 
residence. 
"All four of the architects that testified at trial [Brighton, Upwall, Stoker, 
and Hoff] agreed that, to be a residence, the carriage house needed facilities for 
cooking, sleeping, and living-in other words, it needed a kitchen, bedroom, and 
a bathroom." (Aplt. Br. at 42.) RJW's expert, Rick Brighton, offered his opinion 
that the carriage house was "basically, a two-car garage with an office on top" 
and that the office contained "habitable space" because "it has electrical service. 
It has heat. It has plumbing. It has all the requirements- basically, passes all the 
requirements for occupancy." (R.2808:85.) Brighton was then asked about the 
SBDC: 
Q. Okay. For purposes of eating and cooking facilities, what are 
the requirements, as you understand them? In other words, does 
there have to be a stove? Does there have to be a particular-
13 
A. Well, it's not overly defined in the code, other than it just says 
eating, cooking and sanitation, which is pretty broad, but eating. I 
mean, there's a table with chairs. I suppose you would need dishes 
as well. Once again, it's very capable of satisfying those 
requirements. 
(R.2808:86-87.) 
On cross-examination, Brighton testified that he did not know how 
Summit County interpreted the SBDC on the precise issue of cooking facilities: 
''I'm not sure what the county says. All they say is cooking. That's their 
definition. There isn't an elaboration on that term." (R.2808:107-08.) RJW 
presented no other evidence on this issue. 
Michael Stoker, the independent architect hired to advise the HOA, offered 
his opinion that the carriage house was not a residence: 
Q. And how do you reach that conclusion? 
A. Well, for me, a residence is something that includes a sleeping 
area. So, you can't reside in a structure such as a garage or an office 
without cooking facilities and bathrooms and bedrooms. So, to me, 
the dwelling would mean the house, not the accessory building. 
(R.2808:181.)4 
4 Stoker was asked for his understanding of how Summit County applies the 
relevant provisions of the SBDC, but an objection to the question was sustained. 
(R.2808:181-82.) RJW is correct that Stoker did not specifically testify that a 220-
volt outlet is required. This means there were three witnesses, not four, who 
testified about this requirement. 
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Heath's architect, Michael Upwall, also testified that the carriage house did 
not violate the CC&Rs: "It is a nonresidential structure." (R.2809:53.) 
Q. Okay and what would make something a residential 
structure? 
A. If it had the facilities to support life, to live there, to cook, to 
sleep, to- I believe the county holds it to the definition of is there a 
possibility for, or plumbed, or the intention for a range and either a 
220 volt range or a gas range for cooking appliance. 
Q. Okay and you know that based on your experience? 
A. Yes. 
~ (R.2809:53.) 
i ,,..!\ 
\9 
The disputed witness, Sean Lewis, testified about how Summit County 
interprets the SBDC: 
Q. What are the elements that you use in determining whether or 
not a particular room or couple of rooms are a residence? 
A. Residence - we use the definitions as found in the [SBDC] .... 
In general, a residence will have three elements: cooking, sleeping, 
and living facilities. So, generally, it will have a kitchen, a bedroom 
and a bathroom. 
Q. All right. Do you consider [a] microwave a kitchen or cooking 
facility? 
A. It has been the practice of the department that a microwave, 
by itself, would not. It would require an oven or a stove, a 
refrigerator, a sink. 
Q. And let's assume I brought you a project ... and it didn't have 
a stove in it, but it had 220 electrical outlet in what might be 
considered the kitchen area or it was plumbed for natural gas in 
what might be considered the kitchen area, how do you look at it? 
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A. It depends on the situation and the plans. We would look at 
those as what the intent are and what is labeled on the plans. If it's 
labeled on the plans as storage areas, but there's, obviously, hook-
ups that could be connected to kitchen appliances that are 
commonly found, we might consider that a kitchen but, in general, it 
all depends on what .it's labeled on the plans and what the plans 
state. 
Q. And if it's just a 110 outlet is all you have, would you consider 
that [a] hook-up for an oven or a stove, cooking facilities? 
A. Generally, no. 
(R.2809:248-49.) 
The final witness at trial was Heath's retained expert, Eric Hoff. He also ~ 
testified that the carriage house was a nonresidential structure. (R.2810:39.) He 
reached this conclusion by looking at several different things, including the 
SBDC. (R.2810:39.) He testified specifically that it wasn't a dwelling unit as that 
term is defined in the SBDC: 
Q. Okay and how do you reach that conclusion? 
A. One, it doesn't have what is, in my opinion, a cooking facility. 
It's lacking a stove or the facilities to put a stove in, whether it 
would be a natural gas plumbed into that counter area or a 220 
outlet in there, which is typically required, and that's been my 
experience in all the different jurisdictions where I've designed these 
type of structures .... 
(R.2810:40.) 
Ruling That the Carriage House Was Not a Residence. The trial court 
interpreted Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs as follows: "The Court interprets 
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the intent of this provision is to restrict the number of residential structures on a 
Lot." (R.3031.) The court then explained that the relevant definitions require 
looking at the intent and content of the structure to determine whether it was a 
~ residence. (R.3031-32.) RJW does not claim this interpretive framework is 
erroneous. 
Regarding intent, the court concluded: "No evidence has been presented 
that the Carriage House was designed and intended for use and occupancy as a 
residence or dwelling by Mr. Heath or any other person." (R.3032.) 
Regarding content, the court concluded that "Summit County does not 
consider a building to be a dwelling if it does not contain a full kitchen, including 
a 220-volt wiring or natural gas plumbing for a stove." (R.3033.) The court relied 
on testimony from four witnesses. The court found that Upwall testified that 
"under the applicable provisions of the [SBDC] and the County's policies and 
practice, a structure is not considered a dwelling unless it contains cooking 
facilities that require a 220-volt electrical system, or natural gas system sufficient 
for a stove or range, and that a microwave oven is not considered cooking 
facilities." (R.3025.) The court found that Eric Hoff testified that "[b]ased on his 
experience and review of the applicable codes," the carriage house "is not a 
'dwelling' or residence as defined under the CC&Rs or [SBDC]" because it does 
not contain "a full kitchen that includes a stove and the wiring or plumbing for a 
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stove, in particular a 220 volt wiring or other natural gas plumbing for a stove." 
(R.3026-27.) The court found that Michael Stoker testified that the carriage house 
"is not a single family dwelling or residence." 5 (R.3026.) Finally, the court 
Mr. Lewis testified that it is Summit County's policy and 
practice that cooking requires a full kitchen, including provision for 
a stove that requires 220 volt wiring or natural gas plumbing for a 
stove or range, and that a microwave oven does not qualify as a 
cooking facilities [sic] sufficient to meet the definition of a dwelling. 
(R.3027.) 
After reciting the testimony from these four witnesses, the trial court 
concluded: "The Court considers the policy and practice of Summit County to be 
applicable in this instance and since the Carriage House does not contain (and 
was not designed to contain) a full kitchen it does not meet the criteria to be 
considered a 'single family dwelling."' (R.3033.) Finally, pointing back to both 
intent and content, the court concluded: "Thus, the Carriage House does not 
meet the 'intended use' or 'design' requirements to be considered a 'single family 
dwelling."' (R.3033.) 
Evidence Regarding Approval of "Complete Plans." In early September 
2012, Heath submitted his first set of plans to the HOA and its independent 
5 As noted above, the court mistakenly found that Stoker specifically testified 
that a 220-volt outlet was required. Stoker did not mention this precise 
requirement, but did offer his opinion that the carriage house was not residence. 
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architect, Stoker. (R.2808:144; Pl. Exhs. 4 & 5.) In those plans, the garage and 
office were attached to the house. (R.2808:155; 2809:115.) Heath's architect 
redesigned the plans with a detached carriage house. (R.2809:14, 90-91, 106-09, 
~ 113.) Heath sub1nitted this second set of plans to Stoker and the HOA in early 
October 2012. (R.2809:40; Def. Exh. R.) 
Heath testified that these were "full plans, complete plans." (R.2809:127-
28.) Upwall testified that Heath "could not begin any construction until we had 
the plat amendment" from the County and that he couldn't get the plat 
amendment approved without approval from the HOA. (R.2809:40.) "So, we 
went in with the full package to the HOA to get their approval." (R.2809:40.) 
Stoker also testified that these were "complete plans" even if they were not the 
final, approved plans: "Well, they, certainly, they weren't finished to go to the 
building departinent for a building permit, but they were far enough along for 
the HOA and the architectural committee to do a review on it." (R.2808:161-62.) 
Stoker reviewed these plans and, on October 9th, sent a letter to Joseph 
Tabacco, President of the HOA and chair of the AC, recommending that Heath's 
plans be approved, contingent on the County's approval of the plat amendment. 
(Def. Exh. R; Pl. Exh. 9; R.2808:157.) Stoker testified that his letter was intended 
to recommend final approval under the CC&Rs, not just contingent approval so 
that Heath could seek the plat amendment. (R.2808:179.) 
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Stoker's letter noted six issues that needed to be addressed. (Pl. Exh. 9.) 
Tabacco testified that "Mr. Upwall addressed the issues that Mr. Stoker had 
raised in his letter and he did so point-by-point and I was satisfied." 
received responses to Stoker's issues and that Mr. Stoker's recommendation was 
that the plans, as presented, were good to go for final approval." (R.2809:221.) 
Tabacco received approval from the other members of the AC and then sent an 
approval letter to Heath, dated October 10, 2012. (R.2809:222-24.) Tabacco 
testified that "the intent" of his October 10th letter "was to say that the HOA 
signs off on the final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're 
good to go. I was just communicating that to the county." (R.2809:225.) 
On October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again that the 
HOA had approved his project. (Def. Exh. R.) Summing up, at trial Tabacco was ~ 
asked, "Did the architectural review committee or the HOA approve Mr. Heath's 
[plans] for development on lot 17?" He responded, "Yes." (R.2809:226.) 
Ruling that Complete Plans Were Approved. The trial court concluded: 
"The preponderance of the evidence indicates that Mr. Heath submitted his plans 
to the HOA and that the HOA approved Mr. Heath's proposed construction 
project." (R.3028.) "Mr. Heath was entitled to rely upon the HOA' s approval," 
the court concluded, "and move forward with the construction on the Heath 
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Property." (R.3028.) The court noted that there were questions about whether 
the HOA fulfilled its responsibility, but said that was not Heath's problem: 
Whether the HOA (as opposed to Mr. Heath) fulfilled its 
obligations under CC&Rs Article II and Design Guidelines Article II 
is not at issue here and, indeed, is the subject of separate litigation. 
The Court by these findings does not intend to, and does not, make 
any determination as to whether, and to what extent, the HOA 
complied with its obligations in this regard. 
(R.3029.) What mattered to the court was that "Mr. Heath fulfilled his 
obligations" by obtaining approval before commencing construction. (R.3029.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Two legal claims are at issue on appeal. First, RJW claims that the 
~ "carriage house" is an unlawful second residence under the CC&Rs. Second, 
·:, RJW claims that Heath violated the CC&Rs by failing to obtain the HOA's 
approval of "complete plans" before commencing construction. RJW bore the 
burden on both issues at trial, and on appeal it has the burden of demonstrating 
that the factfinder' s conclusions were against the clear weight of the evidence. 
I. Any error in allowing Sean Lewis to testify was harmless. 
Even if the trial court erred by allowing Lewis to testify, that error was 
harmless. The trial court ruled - and RJW does not disagree-that two factors 
determine whether the carriage house was a residence: intent and content. The 
~ trial court correctly found that there was "no evidence" that Heath intended to 
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use the carriage house as a residence. And three other witnesses, besides Lewis, 
testified that the carriage house in fact was not a second residence. RJW' s 
argument that "the [trial] court lacked evidence to determine whether the 
carriage house was a residence" (Aplt. Br. at 44)- as if lack of such evidence 
means RJW prevails-ignores the fact that RJWhad the burden of proving its 
claim that the carriage house was an improper residence. Excluding Lewis's 
testimony would not have supplied RJW' s missing evidence. Any error in 
admitting such testimony was thus harmless. 
Alternatively, the trial court's ruling comports with the ordinary meaning 
of the terms "single family dwelling" and "residence" and thus satisfies the 
CC&Rs. A mere room over a garage- especially of the sort at issue here- is not 
generally understood to be a separate JI dwelling" or JI residence." 
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Lewis to 
testify. 
In any event, there are four reasons the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Lewis to testify. 
First, before moving to exclude Lewis based on incomplete disclosure, 
RJW was required to make "an effort to secure the disclosure ... without court ~ 
action." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3) (2011).6 Heath disclosed Lewis as a nonretained 
6 Rule 37 was amended in 2015. All citations to Rule 37 in this brief are to the 
2011 version. 
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expert six months before trial. RJW made no attempt to get additional 
information "without court action." Instead, RJW waited until four days before 
trial and· then moved to exclude Lewis. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying this motion because it was untimely and failed to comply 
with Rule 37. 
Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the 
description of Lewis's testimony was adequate under the circumstances. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes. Heath made several attempts to 
meet with Lewis but was unable to do so until shortly before trial. Under these 
circumstances, the initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was 
consistent with Rule 26. 
Third, there was no abuse of discretion because the supplemental 
description of Lewis's testimony was timely. Heath provided a fuller description 
of Lewis's anticipated testimony the day after he was able to interview Lewis. 
See id. 26( d)(1 ), 26( d)(5). 
Fourth, if the supplemental disclosure was untimely, there was "good 
cause" for this failure and the untimeliness was "harmless." See Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(d)(4), 37(h). Good cause exists because Heath's counsel made "several failed 
attempts" to meet with Lewis and supplemented the day after he was able to do 
so. There is no harm because Heath's position on this issue was established 
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through several other witnesses long before the supplemental disclosure. Again, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
III. The trial court's conclusion that complete plans were submitted 
and approved is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The factual record supports the trial court's conclusion that "Mr. Heath 
fulfilled his obligations" under Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs. (R.3029.) 
There was testimony from Heath, Upwall, and Stoker that the plans submitted to ~ 
the HOA' s AC were "complete." There is no dispute that those plans were 
approved. And RJW failed to submit any evidence that what Heath actually 
built differed in any way from the plans approved by the HOA. Further, harm is 
an essential element of a claim for breach of contract. Even if complete plans 
were not approved, RJW cannot prove any harm justifying the relief it seeks. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Lewis's testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial and, thus, any 
error in admitting his testimony was harmless. 
RJW "bears two burdens on appeal: first, to demonstrate that the [trial] 
court erred by admitting [Lewis's] testimony ... , and second, to show that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached absent 
the error." R.B. V. L.B., 2014 UT App 270, ,r 39 (internal quotation marks ~ 
omitted). See also Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ,r 21 ("On appeal, the 
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial--that there is 
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a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.") 
4Jj (quotation marks omitted). An error is harmless "if, upon a review of the record, 
there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." LePet, 
Inc., 872 P.2d at 473 (quotation marks omitted). "Even when the trial court has 
erred in its evidentiary decision, reversal is appropriate only in those cases 
where, after review of all the evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been 
reached." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40, il 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
This court will not "assume that allowing the testimony changed the result." 
R.B., 2014 UT App 270, if 40. 
To be clear, as explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by allowing Lewis to testify. But we start with harmlessness because it is the 
~ simplest way for the Court to dispose of RJW' s attack on the evidentiary ruling. 
First, there was ample evidence, even absent Lewis's testimony, to support 
Heath's position that the carriage house was not a residence. Second, RJW bore 
the burden of proof and now admits that without Lewis's testimony, the trial 
court "lacked evidence to determine whether the carriage house was a 
residence." (Aplt. Br. at 44.) 
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A. Even without Lewis's testimony, there was ample evidence that 
the carriage house was not a residence. 
The trial court found that both the "intended use" and the "design" of the 
carriage house mattered when determining whether it was a residence. In its 
findings of fact, the trial court noted that "Heath testified that he does not nor 
does anyone else use the Carriage House as a residence or dwelling and that he 
does not intend it to be used for such," and that his architect, Upwall, "also 
testified that the Carriage House was not designed nor intended for use as a 
single-family dwelling." (R.3025.) 
In its conclusions of law, the court says: "No evidence has been presented 
that the Carriage House was designed and intended for use and occupancy as a 
residence or dwelling by Mr. Heath or any other person." (R.3032.) In other 
words, on one of the two factors for determining whether the carriage house was 
a residence (i.e., intended use), the undisputed evidence supports Heath's 
position. The exclusion of Lewis would have made no difference on this point.7 
As for the second factor (i.e., design), Lewis's testimony provided an ~ 
additional layer of support, but it was, as RJW noted, "cumulative and 
duplicative." (R.2562.) The "cumulative" nature of erroneously admitted 
evidence is a frequent feature of harmless error. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
7 RJW relegates this issue to a single footnote in its brief and does not seriously ~ 
challenge the trial court's conclusion. (Aplt. Br. at 44-45 n.20.) 
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County, 794 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1990) ("[A]ny error in admitting the 
administrative record ... was harmless because it was essentially cumulative 
with respect to the evidence already before the court."), rev' d on other grounds 
~ 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).B 
And Lewis's testimony was, in fact, cumulative. RJW acknowledges that 
"[a]ll four of the architects that testified at trial agreed that, to be a residence the 
carriage house needed facilities for cooking, sleeping, and living." (Aplt. Br. at 
42.) RJW further concedes that two of the architects, besides Lewis, testified that 
a microwave does not constitute a kitchen and that a 220-volt outlet or a gas 
hook-up for a stove is required. (Aplt. Br. at 43.) 
Yet RJW still argues that "Lewis's testimony was the sole basis of the [trial] 
court's decision that the carriage house is a 'related nonresidential sh·ucture."' 
~ (Aplt. Br. at 45.) RJW points to the trial court's conclusion that "the policy and 
practice of Summit County [is] applicable in this instance" and argues that "none 
of the architects testified directly regarding Summit County's practice and 
8 See also State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984) (" At best, her testimony was 
cumulative. If error was committed, it was harmless."); State v. Thomas, 777 
P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) ("In view of the fact, however, that the officer's 
testimony was merely cumulative to that already testified to by the victim, the 
error was harmless .... "); State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (" Although the trial court improperly allowed Ms. Wilson to testify, we 
find the error harmless because Ms. Wilson's testimony was either cumulative or 
not critical."). 
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procedure for determining whether a structure was residential. Only Sean Lewis 
so testified." (Aplt. Br. at 43.) ~ 
With respect, that's not true. Both Upwall and Hoff testified directly 
d . c · r , . regar mg ....,urrim1t -.ounty s practice. Up1Nall specifically testified that "the 
county holds it to the definition of is there a possibility for, or plumbed, or the 
intention for a range and either a 220 volt range or a gas range for cooking 
appliance" and explained that he knew this based on his experience. (R.2809:53.) 
Hoff testified that he had experience as an architect on projects in Summit 
County. (R.2810:9.) He testified that he had reviewed the SBDC. (R.2810:11, 39.) 
And he was asked specifically whether the carriage house was a dwelling "under 
this definition" in the SBDC. (R.2810:39-40.) His response was that it was 
"lacking a stove or the facilities to put a stove in, whether it would be natural gas 
plumbed ... or a 220 outlet in there, which is typically required, and that's been ~ 
my experience in all the different jurisdictions where I've designed these type of 
structures." (R.2810:40.) 
The trial court's written ruling specifically refers to this testimony. The 
court credited the testimony of Mr. Upwall: 
that under the applicable provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code and the County's policy and practice, a structure is not considered 
a 'dwelling' unless it contains cooking facilities that require a 220-
volt electrical system or a natural gas system sufficient for a stove or 
range, and that a microwave is not considered cooking facilities. 
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(R.3025 (emphasis added).) The court also credits the testimony of Eric Hoff: 
Based on Mr. Hoff s experience and review of the applicable codes and 
regulations, a structure is not considered a residence or dwelling 
unless it contains a full kitchen that includes a stove and the wiring 
or plumbing for a stove, in particular a 220-volt wiring or other 
natural gas plumbing for a stove. 
(R.3026-27 (emphasis added).) 
Plus, there was another piece of undisputed evidence regarding Summit 
County's policy and practice as it applies to this case-perhaps the most 
persuasive evidence of all: the County approved Heath's application for a building 
permit. The trial court pointed this out during the trial: 
The Court: I mean, the county approved this, right? 
Mr. Egan: Yes, it did. Yes, it did. 
The Court: So, presumably, the county doesn't think it's an accessory 
dwelling unit ... or it wouldn't have approved it. 
(R.2809:49-51.) Summit County plainly did not consider the carriage house a 
dwelling or residence, or it would not have approved it. 
But in all events, what ultimately governs the legal meaning of terms like 
"single family dwelling" and "residence" under the CC&Rs, as RJW helpfully 
reminds us in its brief (Aplt. Br. at 46.), is their "ordinary and generally 
understood and popular sense." Holladay Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells, 2002 
UT App 125, il 2, (quotation marks omitted). In this context, the ordinary sense 
of those terms is "the place where one actually lives" and "a building used as a 
29 
home." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 996 (10th ed. 1993). It was 
by no sh·etch "against the clear weight of the evidence," Bryan, 1999 UT App, il 
5, for the trial court to conclude, after hearing the evidence and inspecting the 
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dwelling" or "residence" in any ordinary sense of those words despite the 
existence of a toilet, fridge, and microwave. 
In sum, there was ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion 
that the carriage house was not a dwelling or residence. 
B. RJW admits it did not submit sufficient evidence to meet its 
burden of proof. 
It was not Heath's burden to prove that the carriage house was not a 
residence; rather, it was RJW's burden to prove that it was. "The plaintiff has the 
burden of showing the contract breach .... " John Call Eng' g, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). 
RJW's appeal rests on the premise that the "policy and practice of Summit 
County" was determinative, and that Lewis was the only witness to address this Cliiil 
issue. (Aplt. Br. at 43-44.) Indeed, RJW argues that besides Lewis "none of the 
architects," including its own, 11 were qualified to testify about Summit County's 
practice." (Aplt. Br. at 45.) And then RJW makes this damning concession: 
"Without Lewis's testimony, the [trial] court lacked evidence to determine 
whether the carriage house was a residence." (Aplt. Br. at 44.) Because it was 
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RJW's burden to prove that the carriage house was a residence, this lack of 
~ evidence is fatal to RJW' s appeal. 
And it is true that RJW offered no evidence regarding the policy and 
~ practice of Summit County. RJW's expert, Rick Brighton, testified that he did not 
know what Summit County's policy and practice was: "I'm not certain what the 
county says. All they say is cooking. That's their definition. There isn't an 
elaboration on that term." (R.2808:107-08.) Thus, any error in allowing Lewis to 
testify is patently harmless because RJW failed to prove its case regardless of 
what evidence Heath did or did not present. In other words, the absence of 
Lewis's testimony, which disproves RJW's position, still leaves RJW without any 
evidence to prove its position. Hence, the alleged error in allowing Lewis to 
testify was harmless. This Court should affirm because any error in admitting 
~ Lewis's testimony was plainly harmless. 
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Sean Lewis to 
testify as a nonretained expert. 
In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. RJW fails to 
acknowledge, much less shoulder, the steep burden it faces on appeal. "The trial 
vJ court is afforded broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and we will 
disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40, ,r 16. 
In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court "will not reverse a trial court's 
ruling on evidence unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Id. 
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Further, " [ a ]n appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision to admit 
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling." R.B., 2014 UT App 270, iI 35 (internal quotation marks 
The court denied RJW's motion to exclude Lewis for two broad reasons: 
First, it was untimely and defective. Second, the disclosure was adequate. The 
court was correct on both counts, and this Court can affirm on either ground. 
Moreover, there are multiple reasons why the disclosure was adequate, each of 
which is independently sufficient to affirm. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying RJW's 
motion to exclude Lewis because it was untimely and failed to 
comply with Rule 37. 
Heath timely disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert six months before 
trial. RJW contends that the description of his anticipated testimony was 
inadequate under Rule 26. The trial court held that RJW had an obligation to 
seek additional information and not wait until the "eve of trial" to object: 
[I]t seems, to me, that there, probably, is some obligation on 
the part of Mr. Egan [RJW's counsel], at that point, to say, "Hey, I 
don't have enough information. Please give me more information. 
Your disclosure is, in my view, insufficient." And, if no response is 
forthcoming, I think, at that point, Mr. Egan would be well-
positioned to say, "Hey, these folks shouldn't be able to testify." On 
the other hand, I'm not sure it's fair to take a disclosure that is, sort 
of, borderline, and not raise any objections to it until the eve of trial. 
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So, I'm going to allow Mr. Lewis to go ahead and testify. He 
was disclosed. Even though the disclosure was borderline. I'm 
going to allow the testimony to come in. 
(R.2808:16-17.) 
Before a party moves to exclude a witness- a sanction authorized by Rule 
37-that party must "attempt[ ] to confer with the other affected parties in an 
effort to secure the disclosure or discovery without court action." Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court was exactly right-RJW 
had an obligation to inform Heath that it didn't have enough information and to 
ask for more. In fact, RJW had an obligation to certify that it had done this when 
it moved to exclude Lewis. Id. 
This case presents a good example of why this 1neet-and-confer process is 
neces~ary. Its very purpose is to see if the information can be obtained through 
~ consultation and good-faith accommodations "without court action." Id. If RJW 
had timely informed Heath that his disclosure of Lewis was inadequate, the issue 
might have been resolved without court action, including this costly appeal. 
Also, the meet-and-confer process prevents the very "sandbagging" RJW 
complains of. RJW received a "borderline" disclosure and said nothing. Heath 
proceeded on the assumption the disclosure was adequate, until four days before 
trial when RJW finally objected and moved to exclude. 
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Additionally, a timely motion under Rule 37, after the meet-and-confer 
process, protects the court's options for handling the issue, including its 
discretion over appropriate sanctions. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT 75, if 15 
("Trial courts have broad discretion in determining discovery sanctions .... "). 
This is especially important in situations where a court may want to sanction the 
attorney who made the mistake rather than imposing a hardship on the client 
that impacts the truth-seeking function of trial. See Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, 
ir 29 ("[A]s a general rule, when the fault lies solely with the attorneys, the 
impact of the sanction should be lodged with the attorneys.") (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). For example, if the Lewis disclosure was 
indeed inadequate, a timely motion by RJW would have allowed the trial court 
to determine if, as an alternative to excluding Lewis, RJW- should instead receive 
more time to prepare for Lewis's testimony and then be awarded fees and costs 
for the inconvenience. That certainly would have been within the court's 
discretion. But RJW' s decision to not object until the eve of trial tied the court's 
hands. 
RJW argues that it had no obligation to object or request additional 
information. (Aplt. Br. at 33.) That is not the best reading of the rules. As noted, 
when a party receives an "incomplete disclosure" it must first make an attempt 
to get the information "without court action" - in other words, to ask the other 
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side for more complete information. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1)(A), 37(a)(3) (2011). 
The trial court was, therefore, correct to point out RJW' s obligation to object and 
seek more information rather than sit back and wait until the "eve of trial" to 
~ move to exclude Lewis. (R.2808:16-17.) 
The requirement to seek more information "without court action" for an 
"incomplete disclosure," Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a) (2011), contrasts with the harsher 
sanction associated with an entirely "undisclosed witness," see id. at R. 26(d)(4). 
The difference makes sense. As RJW points out, Heath's supplemental 
disclosure also disclosed a brand new witness, Robert Taylor. The trial court 
correctly granted the motion to exclude Taylor because RJW obviously could not 
confer with opposing counsel and seek additional information about Taylor 
because it had no knowledge he might be a witness. But Lewis, by contrast, was 
disclosed and RJW could have asked for additional information about his 
anticipated testimony. Instead, RJW treated Lewis like an undisclosed witness. 
RJW argues in a footnote that Rule 37, which uses the permissive word 
"may," "does not require" a party to move "the court to compel disclosure." 
(Aplt. Br. at 34, n.14.) It is certainly true that a party faced with an "incomplete 
disclosure" is not required to move to compel or for sanctions: it can simply 
accept the incomplete disclosure. But a motion is obviously required if a party 
wants the sanction of exclusion. The problem here is that RJW failed to first seek 
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additional information without court action, as Rule 37 requires, and then waited 
until the eve of trial to move to exclude Lewis. That motion was defective and ~ 
untimely, and it was well within the trial court's discretion to deny it. 
2015 UT 23. In that divorce case, the husband submitted discovery responses on 
June 1, 2007. The wife remained silent for two years and then, two months 
before trial, filed a motion to compel supplemental responses. This Court said 
the wife's motion was too little too late. 
Ms. Dahl did not notify Dr. Dahl that she considered his 
discovery requests to be deficient until July 21, 2009. The court 
specifically noted that Ms. Dahl's counsel had received Dr. Dahl's 
discovery responses in December 2007, but waited until July 2009-
less than two months before the September 2009 trial date- to 
request supplementation or to challenge the _sufficiency of the 
responses. And counsel offered no explanation for the long delay. 
We cannot conclude that the [trial] court abused its discretion when 
it found that Ms. Dahl's motion was "too little too late." 
That same reasoning applies here. The trial court did not abuse its ~ 
discretion by denying RJW' s motion. 
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B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the 
initial disclosure of Lewis's anticipated testimony was 
"borderline" but sufficient under Rule 26. 
The trial court gave a second reason for allowing Lewis to testify: the 
initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was adequate. Lewis was 
disclosed in September 2013, with the following description of his anticipated 
testimony: 
Defendants/Counterclaimants identify the following "non-retained" 
experts as they provided architectural, planning, construction and or 
design services for the Heath project. Additionally these witnesses 
may be asked to provide specific architectural, design, construction, 
or general building opinions regarding the Heath project as well as 
opinions and facts regarding Plaintiffs' deck, thus these witnesses 
are therefore included in this designation. 
(Aplt. Br. Add. B; R.955-65.) 
The trial court called this description "bo~derline" but sufficient under 
Rule 26(a)(4)(E). The requirement is to "serve on the other parties a written 
summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(E). But the advisory committee notes explain that the 
11 written summary" will differ according to the circumstances. When possible, 
"the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that-a 
summary." Id. advisory committee notes. It does not have to be II prefiled 
testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial," but 
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should be "more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made 
under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(1)." Id. 
But sometimes even less is required. "Not all information will be known 
at the outset of a case." Id. And "[a] party is not required to interview every 
witness it ultimately may call at trial in order to provide a summary of the 
witness's expected testimony." Id. Plus, "[f]or uncooperative or hostile 
witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to 
the subject areas the witness is reasonably expected to testify about." Id. 
Specifically referring to nonretained experts, the advisory committee notes state 
that "disclosures will necessarily be more limited" when the witness is 
uncooperative. Id. 
Despite "_several failed attempts," Heath was not able to interview Lewis 
and did not know what he might say. Thus, he initially disclosed only the 
"subject areas" of his anticipated testimony, precisely as Rule 26 suggests. Under 
the circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that this "borderline" disclosure 
was sufficient was not an abuse of discretion. 
C. The supplemental disclosure was timely. 
Rule 26 requires disclosures to be made "based on the information then 
known or reasonably availa_ble to the party." Id. at 26(d)(1). If additional 
information is learned, the disclosure must be "timely" supplemented: 
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If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or 
incorrect in some important way, the party must timely serve on the 
other parties the additional or correct information if it has not been 
made known to the other parties. The supplemental disclosure or 
response must state why the additional or correct information was 
not previously provided. 
Id. at 26(d)(5). 
After "several failed attempts" Heath was able to interview Lewis on 
March 3, 2014. Just as Rule 26 requires, Heath timely- the very next day-
supplemented his disclosure and explained why the information was not 
previously provided. 
RJW argues for a different definition of "timely." Supplemental 
disclosures are untimely, RJW argues, when "provided to a party at a time when 
the party can make no meaningful use of them." _(Aplt. Br. at 36.) But this is not 
the definition suggested by Rule 26, which ties the timeliness of the supplement 
to when the party "learns that a disclosure . . . is incomplete." Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(d)(5). See In re Aramark Sports & Entm't Servs., LLC, 289 F.R.D. 662, 665 (D. 
Utah 2013) (supplemental disclosure was timely where served "as soon as 
possible"). More generally, Rule 26 requires disclosures "based on the 
information then known or reasonably available to the party." Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(d)(l). Supplementation is required "[a]s the information becomes known." 
Id. advisory committee notes. Further, the purpose of the rule is "to discourage 
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sandbagging." Id. Sandbagging implies sitting on information for tactical 
advantage. Requiring prompt disclosure prevents sandbagging. 
And this makes sense. If information comes to light shortly before trial 
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information was not "reasonably available" at an earlier time, the supplemental 
disclosure is timely because the parties will have received the new information at 
about the same time. The trial court would, of course, still have discretion about 
how to handle the new information, but the supplement would be timely. 
Heath was not able to interview Lewis until March 3, 2014, and he 
supplemented his disclosure the next day. Under Rule 26, the supplemental 
disclosure was timely. 
D. Even if the initial disclosure was inadequate and the supplemental 
disclosure was untimely, Lewis's testimony was still admissible 
because any failure in this regard was "harmless" and justified by 
"good cause." 
Even assuming the disclosures were inadequate and untimely, Lewis's 
testimony was still admissible under the two exceptions in Rule 26(d)(4): 
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or 
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed 
witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial unless [1] the 
failure is harmless or [2] the party shows good cause for the failure. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4). 
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The failure to supplement sooner is harmless unless "prejudice would 
~ result from allowing the disputed evidence at trial." 9 Posner v. Equity Title Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ,I 23. RJW cannot plausibly claim prejudice 
~ because no new issue was inh·oduced in the supplemental disclosure. In fact, 
RJW moved to exclude Lewis's tesli1nony as "cu1nulative and duplicative" 
precisely because Heath had "already designated Eric Hoff to testify about these 
very matters." (R.2562.) And that was true. The supplemental disclosure 
explained that Lewis was expected to testify that "under the [SBDC] ... a 
dwelling requires cooking facilities and more particularly, the structure needs to 
be plumbed with a 220V outlet for a stove." (R.2612.) Six months earlier, Eric 
Hoff's expert report pointed specifically at the relevant provisions of the SBDC 
and explained that the carriage house did not violate the CC&Rs because it" does 
not contain provisions for cooking, specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking 
range." (R.2584.) 
Further, this precise issue was disputed when Heath moved for summary 
judgment, which also put RJW on notice that it would be a primary focus at trial. 
Heath argued that the carriage house was not a dwelling because it "does not 
9 This is obviously a different "harmlessness" analysis than that set forth above, 
which assumes it was error to admit Lewis's testimony and asks whether it 
changed the outcome of the trial. The issue here is whether RJW was prejudiced 
in its preparation for trial by the timing of the disclosure. 
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contain a stove, nor does it have a gas line or 220 volt outlet for a stove." 
(R.1825.) In support of that position, Heath offered testimony from Hoff, 
Upwall, and himself on this precise point. (R.1825.) The deposition testimony 
from Heath's architect; Michael Upwall; was almost identical to what Lewis 
would later say at trial: a microwave is not sufficient-cooking facilities "require 
a 220 outlet or a gas line." (R.1808.) 
Thus, when Heath supplemented his disclosures to say that Lewis would 
also testify about this exact issue, there was no "unfair surprise." See R.B., 2014 
UT App 270 if 40. And thus there was no prejudice. Indeed, RJW was prepared 
to address this issue. Its own retained expert, Rick Brighton, submitted his 
rebuttal report on November 11, 2013, in which he offered his interpretation of Giv 
the same provisions of the SBDC that Lewis testified about. (R.2588.) RJW even 
designated the relevant provisions of the SBDC as trial exhibits. (R.2231.) 
"Good cause" is also apparent from the record. See Townhomes at Pointe 
Meadows Owners Ass'n v. Pointe Meadows Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App 52, 
,I 13 (question is whether "good cause excuses tardiness"). Heath made "several 
failed attempts" to interview Lewis, and he supplemented the day after he was 
able to interview him. (R.2666.) Further, it should be noted again that Lewis had 
been disclosed, and RJW had not objected. Under the circumstances, there was 
"good cause" for Heath's failure to supplement sooner. 
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In sum, even if the initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was 
inadequate, and even if Heath should have supplemented sooner, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony because the failure was 
~ either harmless or for good ca use, or both. 
**** 
In brief, even assuming the trial court a bused its discretion by allowing 
Lewis to testify, the error was harmless. Heath presented credible evidence in 
the form of other testimony that the carriage house was not a second residence or 
dwelling-a conclusion that comports with the ordinary sense of those terms. 
RJW has failed to demonstrate that, even excluding Lewis's testimony, the clear 
weight of the evidence requires a contrary conclusion. Thus, RJW' s appeal of the 
trial court's evidentiary ruling fails. 
In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Lewis to 
testify. This Court "will not reverse a trial court's ruling on evidence unless the 
ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40, ,r 16. 
Given all the circumstances, it was perfectly reasonable for the trial court to 
allow Lewis's testimony. Indeed, "[e]xcluding a witness from testifying is ... 
extreme in nature and ... should be employed only with caution and restraint." 
Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App. 171, ,r 10 (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even with a totally "undisclosed witness" -
43 
a much more serious situation than the allegedly inadequate disclosure here-
the trial court still "'retains discretion to determine how properly to address this 
issue in a given case." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes. See also 
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undisclosed witness). Allowing Lewis to testify was not beyond the limits of 
reasonability and thus was not an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. 
III. Adequate evidence supports the factfinder's conclusion that RJW failed 
to prove that Heath breached Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs by 
failing to get his construction plans approved. 
On the issue whether Heath breached Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs, 
RJW does not allege any error in evidentiary or legal rulings. It simply disagrees 
with the trial court's factual finding, arguing that the evidence supports its ~ 
position that the HOA's Architectural Committee (" AC") did not approve 
"complete plans" as required by the CC&Rs. As with the admissibility issue, 
RJW subtly attempts to shift the burden of proof and claim the evidence is 
confused, but once again this tactic only undermines its appeal. Affording 
appropriate deference to the trial court, it is evident that the court's conclusion is 
by no means against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Here is what the evidence showed: In early September 2012, Heath 
submitted his first set of plans to the HOA and its independent architect, Stoker, 
for review. (R.2808:144; Pl. Exhs. 4 & 5.) In those plans, the garage and office Gi}j 
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were attached to the house. (R.2808:155; 2809:115.) Heath's architect redesigned 
the plans with a detached carriage house. (R.2809:14, 90-91, 106-09, 113.) 
Heath submitted this second set of plans to Stoker and the HOA in early 
i@ October 2012. (R.2809:40; Def. Exh. R.) Heath testified that these were "full plans, 
complete plans." (R.2809:127-28 (emphasis added).) Upwall testified that Heath 
"could not begin any construction until we had the plat amendment" from the 
County and that he couldn't get the plat amendment approved without approval 
from the HOA. (R.2809:40.) "So, we went in with the full package to the HOA to 
get their approval." (R.2809:40 (emphasis added).) The HOA's independent 
architect, Stoker, also testified that these were "complete plans" because "they 
were far enough along for the HOA and the architectural committee to do a 
review on it." (R.2808:161-62 (emphasis added).) 
Stoker reviewed these plans between October 5th and 9th. (Def. Exh. R; 
R.2808:157.) On October 9th, he sent a letter to Tabacco recommending that 
Heath's plans be approved, contingent on the County's approval of the plat 
amendment. (Pl. Exh. 9.) Stoker testified that the letter was intended not only to 
recommend approval so that Heath could seek the plat amendment, but as final 
approval under the CC&Rs. (R.2808:179.) 
Stoker's letter noted six minor issues that needed to be addressed. (Pl. 
Exh. 9.) Tabacco testified that "Mr. Upwall addressed the issues that Mr. Stoker 
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had raised in his letter and he did so point-by-point and I was satisfied." 
(R.2809:221.) Tabacco then "specifically communicated [to the AC] that we had 
received responses to Stoker's issues and that Mr. Stoker's recommendation was 
that the plans, as presented, were good to go for final approval." (R.2809:221-22.) 
Tabacco received approval from the other members of the AC and then sent an 
approval letter to Heath, dated October 10, 2012. (R.2809:222-24.) Tabacco 
testified that "the intent" of the October 10th letter "was to say that the HOA 
signs off on the final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're 
good to go. I was just communicating that to the county." (R.2809:225.) 
October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again that 
"uninterested Timber's HOA Board members" had approved his project. 
Exh. R.) 
On 
the 
(Def. 
~ 
~ 
RJW argues that there is" extreme confusion regarding the plans at issue in ~ 
this case and when and to whom various sets of plans were submitted." (Aplt. 
Br. at 47.) "But despite this confusion," RJW continues, "two things are clear: 
First, Michael Stoker ... only reviewed two sets of plans, and neither set of plans 
was complete. Second, there is no evidence in the record that the plans approved 
by Stoker and the AC are the plans that Heath ultimately submitted to the county 
and for which Heath received a building permit." (Aplt. Br. at 48.) 
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On the first point, as noted, there is testimony in the record from Heath, 
Upwall, and Stoker, that the second set of plans were "complete plans." RJW 
challenges this testimony by arguing that complete plans "must have some 
measure of finality- the subject of the plans must be capable of actually being 
built." (Aplt. Br. at 47.) From this, RJW makes the leap that complete plans means 
"plans for which a lot owner could receive a building permit from the county." 
(Aplt. Br. at 47.) That leap is not logical. 
The term complete plans shottld be interpreted in light of the purpose of the 
provision at issue. Review and approval by the AC is obviously not for the 
purpose of getting a building permit from the county; rather, the purpose is to 
"ascertain whether the architecture conforms to the Design Guidelines." (R.19; 
PL Exh. 1.) Thus, complete plans are plans that are capable of being reviewed to 
determine conformance with the Design Guidelines. Anything that is immaterial 
to ensure conformance with the Design Guidelines is irrelevant. 
Michael Stoker, who was hired by the AC to advise them on this very 
issue, testified that the plans he reviewed were "far enough along for the HOA 
and the architectural committee to do a review on it." (R.2808:162.) Pressed, he 
reiterated that "they were complete enough for the HOA and their review 
process." (R.2808:162.) In sum, the trial court did not commit reversible error by 
concluding that complete plans were submitted and reviewed. 
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RJW's second assertion is that "there is no evidence in the record that the 
plans approved by Stoker and the AC are the plans that Heath ultimately 
submitted to the county and for which Heath received a building permit" (Aplt. 
Br. at 48.) This might be persuasive if Heath had the burden of provh1g that the 
plans were the same. But RJW bears the burden of proving the plans reviewed 
were not complete. The lack of evidence of any difference between the plans 
approved by the AC and the plans approved by the county undermines RJW's 
case. RJW offered no evidence that what Heath constructed differs in any way 
whatsoever from what the AC approved.1° 
RJW argues that the second set of plans "were submitted to the AC for the 
purpose of approving the plat amendment," and not for the purpose of approval 
under the CC&Rs. (Aplt. Br. at 48.). In fact, the testimony was to the contrary. 
Stoker's letter plainly recommended final approval of the plans. (Pl. Exh. 9.) Gg; 
And he testified that he recommended approval not only so Heath could seek the 
plat amendment, but also so he could seek final approval under the CC&Rs. 
(R.2808:179.) Tabacco testified that he "specifically communicated" to the AC 
that "we had received responses to Stoker's issues and ... were good to go for 
10 RJW quotes correspondence that suggests the possibilihJ that the plans Heath 
submitted to the County differed in some way from the plans approved by the 
AC. (Aplt. Br. at 50-51.) But RJW failed to present evidence to the trial court as 
to how they differed, if at all, and if there was any difference, whether it was ~ 
material to the AC' s review process. 
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final approval." (R2809:221-22.) Tabacco sent an approval letter to Heath and 
testified that "the intent" of the letter "was to say that the HOA signs off on the 
final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're good to go." 
VP (R.2809:225.) On October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again 
that the "uninterested Timber's HOA Board members" had approved his project. 
(Def. Exh. R.) 
issue. 
In its oral ruling from the bench, the trial court cut right to the core of the 
My task, here, is to try to determine whether Mr. Heath did 
what he was supposed to do under the CC&R's to go ahead and get 
his project approved and I find that he did. Again, I think he, Mr. 
Heath, under the CC&R's needed to get approval. The CC&R's 
don't allow him to just haul off and build whatever he wants in his 
back yard. They don't allow him to build any kind of home he 
wants on his lot. The CC&R's require that Mr. Heath submit plans 
to the HOA and get those plans approved and Mr. Heath did that. 
(R.2810:193.) 
The trial court's conclusion that "the preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that Mr. Heath did not violate CC&Rs Article II and Design 
Guidelines Article II" is not against the clear weight of the evidence. (R.3029.) 
Alternatively, even if the "complete plans" provision was breached, RJW 
has not proved any harm. RJW has sued Heath for breach of contract, and the 
only remedy it seeks is an injunction requiring Heath to tear everything down 
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and start over. Harm is an essential element of a breach-of-contract claim. See 
Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ,r 15. Even if the plans 
approved by the HOA were not "complete" plans, RJW did not submit evidence 
of any harm. RTlAT ,..1~..-1 ..... ""~ sHh~,~ rn,-irln-nl""'e 1 J V V U.lU .1 lV L U Ll.l.l L.11.. '- V J.U.~J. l'- - I for example, that ,,vhat Heath 
constructed violates the Design Guidelines. 
As the trial court pointed out, RJW's only requested remedy did not fit the 
circumstances, even if there was a technical breach of the CC&Rs: "Well, let's 
assume you' re right" that Heath did not get the required approval, the court 
asked during closing arguments. "Why is it tear-down? Why isn't it he has to go 
back to the HOA a_nd get that approval ... ?" (R.2810:141.) "[T]his is built and 
we have, at most here, a procedural violation. We have-what you're alleging is 
they didn't jump through the right hoops to procedurally approve this thing, 
and, so, you want me to go back and bring the wrecking ball in. That seems like 
a little bit too much remedy for the problem, no?" (R.2810:114-15.) 
The remedy must fit the harm. And RJW failed to prove any harm. There 
is no evidence RJW suffered any monetary harm. Nor is there any harm in the 
form of noncompliance with the Design Guidelines. There is no evidence that 
the approval process did not serve its intended purpose of ensuring that plans 
comply with the Design Guidelines. Thus, not only did RJW fail to prove that 
Heath did not get complete plans approved; RJW failed to prove that any harm 
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resulted from this alleged technical violation. Its breach of contract claim 
~ therefore fails. 
CONCLUSION 
RJW doesn't like Heath's new home and has raised CC&R technicalities to 
get some or all of it torn down. It claims that a mere room over the garage 
renders the garage an improper second residence and that Heath failed to submit 
complete plans to the HOA. The trial court held a trial, examined the facts, and 
rejected RJW' s claims. 
RJW now complains about a single evidentiary ruling allowing Lewis, one 
of several witnesses on the second-residence issue, to testify. But the outcome of 
this case would not have been different if the trial court had excluded Lewis's 
testimony. As RJW accurately noted before trial, Lewis's testimony was 
~ cumulative. Other witnesses supplied ample evidence supporting the court's 
finding that the carriage house was not a second residence - a conclusion further 
confirmed by the ordinary meaning of the relevant CC&R terms. The most RJW 
can muster is that excluding Lewis would have left insufficient evidence to 
adjudicate the second-residence issue. But if true, RJW still loses because it had 
an affirmative duty to supply sufficient evidence not only to adjudicate but to 
prevail on that issue. In any case, for multiple reasons the trial court was well 
within its broad discretion in refusing to exclude Lewis's testimony. If this Court 
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finds an abuse of discretion here, then that standard will truly have lost its 
meaning and this Court will be very busy second-guessing myriad evidentiary 
rulings. 
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The undisputed testimony was that Heath's plans were "complete." They were 
certainly as II complete" as necessary for the HOA' s Architectural Committee to 
perform its function. And RJW does not contend Heath built a home that was 
different than his submitted plans. So what is the harm to RJW? There is none. 
Hence, this Court can affirm on the alternative ground that RJW failed to prove 
damages for its breach of contract claim alleging violation of the CC&Rs. RJW is 
certainly not entitled to tear down Mr. Heath's home based on a technical 
violation of CC&Rs that was entirely harmless. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and reject RJW' s appeal. 
I 1-"/K-; 
DATED this / (!} day of December, 2015. 
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